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
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
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The **BAROMETER**



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CDR E. H. CRAMER, SMC #2734

The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at NPS and within the U. S. Navy.

GUEST EDITORIAL

The following is excerpted from the editorial page of the New York Times, April 8, 1971:

* VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. -- One too often remains silent on issues which gnaw the vitals of his being. Along with a multitude of others I have long deplored the continuing decline of our country's prestige. Now, the disgraceful trial and conviction of Lieutenant Calley removes any reticence to offer constructive criticism of our government.

In February, 1965, I was one of two task group commanders who launched the first sustained strikes on North Vietnamese targets and shortly thereafter became the commander of Task Force 77, commanding all of the U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. It was during this latter period that a feeling of utter frustration permeated my staff and my entire command. Although we were successful in interdicting North Vietnamese rail lines and inflicting costly damage on the enemy, we were restrained to carrying out a campaign which seemed designed *not* to win.

In the spring of 1965 a photographic reconnaissance plane returned to the flagship with photos which were immediately identified as a surface-to-air missile site. This was the first clear proof that SAM sites were under construction. That same day the planning members of my staff and I flew to Saigon to confer with the Commander, 7th Air Force, and to plan a joint Air Force/Navy strike against this first site, which was not yet completed. The joint plan was proposed through the chain of command and, after what seemed an inordinate delay, the proposal was returned disapproved.

Such a refusal was beyond my comprehension. It was feasible to have destroyed this site and all others still under construction which were ultimately completed. It was not until the North Vietnamese had shot down some numbers of our aircraft that our combined air forces were permitted to strike back at these, now well-established, defensive sites. Since then approximately 115 of our planes have been destroyed by surface-to-air missiles launched from pads which I believe could have been destroyed at a minimum risk before they became operational.

Since departing the Southeast Asia area in the summer of 1965, and continuing on past my retirement, I have witnessed the constant deterioration of morale within our great country. We have been disrupted internally by external sources and to some extent by well-meaning individuals and groups. Our youth have resorted to mild and stronger narcotics to show a defiance of what? They are not really sure.

As a nation, we failed by not declaring war in the traditional manner, by not relying on the inherent patriotism of our people to see this great country through to an early decision. Rather, we relied on a "resolution" which carries none of the force, the restraints or the sacrifices required by a declaration of war.

This mess is not the responsibility of this Administration. It is that of years of national fear aided and abetted by so-called intellectuals within and

outside Government circles. No amount of rhetoric, expounded by self-styled pundits, can erase the simple fact that we have not won this conflict only because we, or our leaders, did not try to win.

Now we are going through a period of "gradual withdrawal." Perhaps this is necessary to buy more time in which to equip and further train the South Vietnamese armed forces. But, if that is not the whole story, and our Government truly believes that we must withdraw gradually to protect our men during withdrawal we are, again, not willing to use the power which is at our disposal.

The President of the United States could, with credibility, say to the North Vietnamese Government:

"We will immediately commence a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam and will complete this operation by the end of 1971 -- provided North Vietnam withdraws her forces to the north of the DMZ and does not interfere in any manner with such a withdrawal nor commit any act of aggression against South Vietnam until the withdrawal is finally completed and, provided, that all prisoners of war are immediately rehabilitated to their homeland. Should North Vietnam violate these provisions in any manner whatsoever, I will direct the air forces of the U.S. to destroy completely Hanoi, Haiphong, all other principal centers of industry and all dikes and dams in North Vietnam."

The peoples of all the world can understand such language and it is my belief that Hanoi would respond favorably.

It is time for this ugly little conflict to end. It is not time to criticize and punish little people who have fought for their country believing such fighting to be in our best national interest.

I join the multitude of former military men who say: "I have killed because I was ordered to and because I believed that by so doing I might have shortened the time our country and our men were exposed to danger. I have ordered bombing against targets which unavoidably must have contained civilians; I would do it again if my country so ordered."

To compare the ridiculous trial of a young lieutenant to the Nuremberg trials is as fallacious as any argument could be. To bring out what a frightened young lieutenant might have said to a group of psychiatrists is the most unjust thing I have ever seen printed.

Lieutenant Calley may not have been a hero, but he represents that sort of young man who has always been the salvation of our nation when the chips were down. He should be pardoned from this unjust sentence at once.

Edward C. Outlaw

Edward C. Outlaw is a retired rear admiral of the U.S. Navy and a consultant in the aerospace industry.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The specific incident described by RADM Outlaw illuminates one facet of the professional environment in which the Naval officer operates. When he states that the refusal of the joint strike plans was beyond his comprehension, what does this imply? The Naval War College was founded to promote the study and development, in a systematic, orderly manner, of the art of war as applied to the sea and contiguous land areas. The mission of NPS is to conduct the advanced education of Naval officers. Does either institution now prepare the Naval officer to comprehend what, six years ago, RADM Outlaw found incomprehensible? If not, must this comprehension be acquired by OJT, or at the other extreme, has the professional Naval officer no choice but to remain incredulous in the face of similar decisions by higher authority in the future?

ONE MAN'S OPINION

In the June, 1971, edition of the Naval Institute Proceedings, the editor recites his experiences with Vice Admiral Rickover in response to the March, 1971, Prize Essay by Captain R. H. Smith, USN. Admiral Rickover made three telephone calls to the editor in quick succession containing the following items:

Telephone Call I: The Prize Essay was the first good article in the Proceedings in the past 20 years, even though the Proceedings was "a useless rag which prints

nothing but meaningless euphoric history, articles by young officers who don't have enough experience to know what's happening in the Navy, and worthless advertisements."

Telephone Call II: The editor of the Proceedings should have a staff member research Admiral Rickover's testimony in the Congressional Record if he wanted to find out and print what is really wrong with the Navy.

Telephone Call III: Admiral Rickover had called Captain Smith to congratulate him, and had been informed by Captain Smith that the Proceedings had changed the sentence concerning Admiral Rickover from "the cantankerous 'vision' of an Admiral Rickover -- whose fundamental message, if we trouble ourselves to learn it, is no less than how to go about building a modern Navy the right way -- is a hundredfold virtue" to read "the cantankerous 'image' of an Admiral Rickover . . ." This proved Admiral Rickover's contention that the Proceedings censors its articles.

Having also enjoyed Captain Smith's article, the editor of the BAROMETER thought it might be interesting to conduct the research recommended in Admiral Rickover's second telephone call, at least insofar as it might relate to NPS. Here is what he said about postgraduate education in 1964:

" It is my opinion . . . that the Navy Postgraduate School located at Monterey, Calif., is largely a correctional institution for the academically deficient. Some graduates of this institution, after 3 years, have received the equivalent of about one year of what would be considered true graduate work at a good engineering college. Only about 20 percent of courses at Monterey are considered to be full graduate-level courses.

In this regard, an interesting anomaly exists in the Navy today. Opponents of my efforts to make the Naval Academy a first-rate educational institution are equally outspoken proponents that every Naval Academy graduate should receive "postgraduate" schooling. This may not sound like an anomaly until it is recognized that it now takes two years of this so-called postgraduate schooling for an Academy graduate to achieve the equivalent of a baccalaureate degree in an engineering or scientific field from a good engineering college. As a result, what the Navy is really saying is that they need officers with meaningful college degrees. This is inadvertent recognition that Naval Academy graduates are not qualified for true graduate-level education.

I recommend that the academic standards of the Naval Academy be raised so that its graduates will be qualified for graduate-level education, and that full advantage be taken by the Navy of graduate courses offered at leading colleges throughout the country. The so-called Naval Postgraduate School could then be phased out over a period of time, commensurate with implementation of Naval Academy academic improvements. . . "

Admiral Rickover's testimony continued to make the following points:

1. Advantages of civilian institutions over NPS:
 - a. Infusion of civilian thought and experience in the officer corps, and resultant inhibition of parochialism normally bred by military life.
 - b. Greater variety of courses available and academic standards "automatically" kept at national levels.
 - c. Likelihood of reduced costs.
 - d. Another nonessential part of the Navy Shore Establishment eliminated.
2. Duty assignments within field of postgraduate study:
 - a. Few officers with postgraduate schooling ever assigned where practical use can be made of these specialties.
 - b. Graduate schooling has become an end in itself.
 - c. Working in technical specialties doesn't seem to fit into the desired Navy career pattern.
 - d. No need for a doctoral degree for a line officer in the Naval profession.
 - e. Money saved by abolishing the doctoral program could go toward improving the Naval Academy faculty.

- f. Graduate education in "international relations, political science, business administration, management, etc.," should be given to officers at the senior command/junior captain levels.

In 1970, Admiral Rickover testified as follows about postgraduate education in the Navy:

" There is no question that today postgraduate education is being used primarily as a device to retain officers in the Navy. The facts and statistics can support no other conclusions. In the past, postgraduate education was provided by the Navy to officers who had completed several years of sea duty and whose academic background and performance warranted the expense and effort of additional formal education. Courses were offered in subjects relating directly to the needs of the Navy, courses where officers possessing such additional education were required to operate the Fleet. Today this has all gone by the board. The requirements a naval officer must meet today to be eligible for postgraduate education are so lax that anyone can apply and be accepted. As you know, the Navy's postgraduate program is run in conjunction with a number of civilian colleges. If a naval officer applies for postgraduate education at one of these civilian colleges, there is no assurance he will be academically acceptable. If he is not, and many fall into this category, the Navy solves the problem by sending him to its own postgraduate school at Monterey . . .

Postgraduate education in the Navy has become another milestone or "requirement" in the career advancement of all naval officers. Present naval personnel policy expects every officer to have attended postgraduate school before he reaches the rank of Lieutenant Commander. It makes no difference if the individual officer wants it or not -- he is expected to program postgraduate schooling into his selection of duties. This means that attending the school becomes a necessity. For those whose duties do not permit attending the postgraduate school, it means a black mark, a hindrance to promotion. This is what has happened in the nuclear submarine program.

Due to the scarcity of young officers qualified in nuclear submarines, it has not been possible to provide all of them the opportunity to attend postgraduate school. These officers are the top in the Navy academically and are far better qualified to pursue postgraduate study than any other group of naval officers. But . . . it is not possible to send many of them to school because their services are vitally needed to man the nuclear ships. However, since the Navy has set a quota for the PG school (sic), it assigns officers of lower caliber to the school. The mere fact that the lesser-qualified officers have attended PG school makes their records look better. It also makes no difference whatsoever what degree the officer gets -- it has no bearing on what he has done or will do subsequently in the Navy. A number of studies have been made on this; they show that most of the graduate studies have little relation to the needs of the Navy; that they are mostly useful in preparing the young officer to leave the Navy.

I should point out that this graduate education is not cheap. It costs the taxpayer a total of over \$70 million a year to provide it to naval officers and to those in the other services. It amounts to \$16,000 to \$22,000 per year per officer -- exclusive of his pay and allowances. . . . In my opinion few jobs in the Navy require a graduate degree. There are some, but I would generously estimate this to be less than 10 percent of what we now provide . . . I have talked with many officers who have attended these schools. They all say they enjoyed the opportunity for two or more years away from their work. But they admit they didn't learn very much that is of use to them in the Navy. . . . If a graduate degree is necessary as a prestige item then I suggest (authorizing) the Naval Academy to grant every graduate a masters or even a doctors degree immediately upon graduation. At any rate it will have about as much merit or prestige as a Masters Degree from the postgraduate school at Monterey has today; it would cost much less and would serve the Navy's needs just about as well. "

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Vice Admiral Rickover has achieved a world-wide reputation as the putative father of the nuclear submarine. As such, he enjoys an exceptional rapport with the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, and has routinely been given a free rein in his testimony. Whether they emanate from a cantankerous vision or cantankerous image, the comments nonetheless have not to date been dignified by either public

disclosure or public comment by any part of the NPS community. Such reluctance to come to grips with less than complimentary statements, regardless of source, may be viewed as a strength, but it can also be interpreted as tacit acceptance. By default, then, failure to address Admiral Rickover's remarks, point by point, to determine their truth or falsity goes a long way towards establishing their credibility. If the facts are other than stated in the testimony, and we believe this to be so, where may the substantiating documentation be found? The BAROMETER would welcome a rational response to Admiral Rickover's impassioned testimony.

NPS BAROMETER QUESTIONNAIRE 1-72 (STUDENTS ONLY)

GRADING SYSTEM

1. Academic quarters at NPS:

- a. 0-4 _____
- b. 5-8 _____
- c. 9-12 _____
- d. Greater than 13 _____

2. Curriculum enrolled in _____

3. My QPR to date is _____

For the following questions, indicate your response using this key :

- 1 - Strongly agree
- 2 - Agree
- 3 - No opinion
- 4 - Disagree
- 5 - Strongly disagree

4. The present grading system at NPS is satisfactory _____

5. The present grading system is a positive motivator, _____
i.e. it increases my desire to excel.

6. The present grading system provides a meaningful _____
measure of my achievements at NPS.

7. The present grading system averages all grades, and makes no
provision for retaking a course in order to remove a
" failing " grade from the QPR. This is a proper method
of grading. _____

8. One proposal for a revised grading system recommends the following:

- a. Honors to indicate truly outstanding performance (1 in 10,
for example)
- b. Credit to indicate satisfactory performance
- c. No Credit to indicate failure to achieve satisfactory perfor-
mance
- d. No credit (Incomplete) to indicate the existence of unusual
circumstances (illness, etc.)

This proposal, if implemented, would be an improvement over
the existing grading system _____

9. A Pass/Fail (Credit/No Credit) system would provide an adequate
measure of student capabilities and would provide me
with sufficient motivation _____

Upon completion, please place this questionnaire in the cardboard
box provided for it in the SMC, or return to SMC # 2734.

** **

REMARKS :

EDITORIAL COMMENT: The questionnaire and certain additions made by the BAROMETER are enclosed. Please fill out the questionnaire (students only, please) and return them to the box in the Student Mail Center.

Assistant Professor Gary TUCK of the OA/Admin. Sciences Department wrote concerning two specific problems he had encountered: the mutilation or outright pilferage of periodicals from the library and the dangerous/illegal maneuvers of bicycle riders in the traffic pattern between NPS and La Mesa Village.

EDITORIAL COMMENT: Concur in your comments, Professor Tuck. Such performance does not reflect creditably on the asserted uniqueness of this student body.